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Human life is structured by a variety of relationships, interactions,
exchanges, and organizations-some are complicated, some are
simple; some are longstanding, while others are brief; and some are
memorialized through formal legal agreement or state-conferred
status, while others remain the product of convenience, habit, or
social convention. Yet one overriding characteristic by which the
state, social communities, and individuals categorize human
relationships and interactions is by distinguishing between those
arising out of emotion-including love, passion, or altruism and
those arising from economic expediency or profit-seeking. In other
words, was the act, relationship, or exchange in question made for
love (broadly construed) or for money?
Researchers know that this "love or money" dichotomy is in many
ways artificial. In the real world, people interact for a variety of
complex, intermingled, and often contradictory reasons. Many people
are passionate about their work and love their jobs, yet nearly all
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enter the labor force and remain employed out of financial necessity.
Conversely, while marriage is associated in American culture with
love, many marry or remain married for reasons of social and
economic advantage. Individuals blur the lines between love and
money in a host of other ways: we purchase intimacy,
companionship, and personal services associated with love, embark
on business and commercial ventures with friends and family
members, and engage in exchange relationships regarding the most
intimate aspects of ourselves-our fertility, our children, our bodies,
our blood-for motivations that appear a combination of altruism and
profit-seeking.
Yet once the "love" or "money" labels have attached to a
relationship or interaction, a variety of personal, social, and legal
consequences flow from that label. Cognitive dissonance may result
for an individual forced to consider in "money" terms a relationship
once in the loving category. Social stigma may attach to those who
transgress societal conventions regarding which interactions should
be motivated by love and which by money. Legal disadvantage may
result to those disempowered by the law's efforts to maintain the
divide between love and money. In some circumstances the law
encumbers or bans outright incursions by money into the realm of
love.
Why has the "love or money" distinction been such an important
and enduring one? To what extent does this distinction reflect reality?
To the extent that it does not, why do we maintain the dichotomy? To
further some state interest? The goals of some societal subgroup? Are
these interests and goals valid ones? Or do they have negative
consequences? These are the questions addressed by our symposium
participants.
In The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Compliance Motivations. Theoretical and Empirical Insights from
the Behavioral Analysis of Law, Yuval Feldman examines the
conventional distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
for human behavior in social psychology and behavioral theory and
outlines their complicated interaction. Focusing on law's role as an
extrinsic motivator, Feldman explains that extrinsic motivation can
reinforce intrinsic motivation by expressing social norms which in
turn influence behavior, or undermine intrinsic motivation through a
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"crowding out" effect. Reasoning from empirical data, Feldman
argues that legal policy-making should take into account these
behavioral realities by attending to how legal incentives are framed,
how closely the legal instrument is tailored to individual intrinsic
motivation, whether legal intervention functions similarly to
monetary incentives and penalties in the particular context where it is
applied, and the role that legal uncertainty plays. Feldman concludes
that the intrinsic and extrinsic behavior categories echo the love or
money divide, and that disentangling them is difficult but nonetheless
important for effective legal interventions.
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff responds with a focus on how
corporate behavior is motivated. She suggests that Feldman's
emphasis on the roles of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
complicates questions of motivation in the legal context. At least
where deterrence is the goal and corporate actions are the target, she
observes, concerns regarding crowding out are moot. She contends
that the dichotomous categories of extrinsic and intrinsic behavior
have little utility in the abstract, and argues for consideration of
multiple motivations and their behavioral effects regardless of their
origin. She proposes reframing the motivation analysis to consider
not only which legal incentives are most likely to deter violators, but
also which nonmonetary goals victims may have: a desire to receive
an apology, for example, or an interest in fair process and public
denunciation.
In Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) From
Economics and Law, Julie A. Nelson argues that, though many
believe that firms are driven by both economics and law to maximize
profits, these views are mistaken on both fronts. Indeed, she
contends, the profit-maximization assumption represents not merely a
myth, but a self-fulfilling prophecy. To the extent we preach that
firms must profit maximize because it is their purpose, "we
undermine the very social values that we may believe we are
defending." What should be feared, she concludes, is not the simple
entry of "money"-prices, money, or market relations-into
significant personal and social relationships, but the entry of narrow
profit-maximization norms that reduce the value of everything to its
contribution to the bottom line.
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In Capturing the "And: ", William W. Bratton agrees with
Nelson's conclusions: corporate law does not now nor has it ever
required shareholder maximization. Indeed, Bratton argues that
corporate law could not require maximization even if it tried. Instead,
corporate law can only facilitate profit maximization, by freeing
firms to attempt to maximize the value of what they produce.
Bratton's primary focus is a related question raised by Nelson's
project: why did profit-maximization come to dominate American
thinking about firms in the first place? He contends that, though the
writings of Adolf Berle continue to be invoked as support for
modern-day shareholder primacy arguments, these invocations rest
on a misunderstanding of Berle's theories. Bratton concludes that
even the financial crisis was an insufficient shock to challenge the
entrenched profit-maximization norms described by Nelson.
In Working Relationships, Laura Rosenbury considers the
significance of social ties at work. Rosenbury points to the legal
dichotomy between intimacy (experienced at home or within the
family unit) and production (the purpose of paid employment), which
closely tracks the love/money divide. The law's insistence on this
dichotomy causes it to miss the noneconomic functions of
relationships at work, and seems particularly perplexing in light of
the common historical roots shared by family law and work law.
Rosenbury argues that law's failure to attend to the workplace as a
site for intimacy has important ramifications for antidiscrimination
goals, in particular. At present, workplace intimacy is both potentially
under-regulated (favoritism based on friendship networks is generally
not actionable, for example) and over-regulated (through sexual
harassment law, which sweeps broadly in the area of sexual
interactions at work). Rosenbury sketches an agenda for legal reform
that draws upon social science literature to ground a functional
approach to relationships that is more attentive to the role of
networks of care and intimacy at work, oriented toward advancing
workplace equality, and less bounded by the preconceived nature or
situs of the relationships.
Ethan Leib affirms the importance of employment as a site where
intimacy forms, agreeing with Rosenbury that law's fixation on
gender hierarchy and sexual harassment is an incomplete response to
the dilemma presented by homophily (the tendency to prefer those

HeinOnline -- 35 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 4 2011

2011]

Introduction

5

who are similar to ourselves along racial, gender, religious, national
origin, or sexual orientation axes) in social networks at work. Leib
discusses empirical research which suggests that individuals are more
likely to perceive coworker interactions as transactional, perhaps
because forces such as law or culture influence our understanding of
intimacy as linked to context. Leib argues that a range of intimacies
are likely operating at work, and that consideration of context is
critical. Moreover, the shifting and permeable boundaries of the
workplace present challenges to any effort to erect a taxonomy of
workplace intimacies, and may have important legal ramifications.
For example, supportive work networks exist even when workers
employed by other entities, such as competitors, suppliers or
distributors. Leib embraces Rosenbury's agenda for reform and
emphasizes the need for specificity and practical guidance, standards
and rules.
In Arm's-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, Marion
Crain argues that work law's frame of employment as an arm'slength, impersonal, cash-for-labor transaction ignores the realities of
dependence and investment that characterize employment for most
workers. The consequences of this frame are experienced most
keenly at termination: with no requirement of notice, no transitional
period and limited income support through the unemployment
insurance system, workers are cast adrift when they are terminated,
even if the termination is through no fault of their own. Crain
contends that work law's blindness to the intimacy inherent in many
employment relationships is unsustainable. Crain looks to family
law-particularly the law of marital termination-for an alternative
model that challenges the love/money dichotomy, and proposes
development of a status-based general law of relationship
termination. The practical effects of this shift might include a
requirement of notice and transitional assistance at discharge linked
to longevity of employment and investment; recognition of and
compensation for the emotional harm linked to termination; and even
the recognition of property rights for workers in collectively created
assets.
Scott Baker responds with a critique rooted in economic theory.
Baker challenges Crain's assumption that employers possess the bulk
of the bargaining power in the employment relation, suggesting that
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her analysis overlooks the ways in which employees exploit the
relationship-specific investments made by employers. Worrying that
Crain's proposal would increase labor costs, prompting employers to
substitute capital investment for labor and reducing overall
employment, Baker argues for a more symmetric analysis that would
create protections for employers where employees quit without notice
or cause. Baker also questions the frequency of arbitrary dischargeis the problem of sufficient magnitude to justify the administrative
costs of regulating it? Finally, Baker critiques Crain's suggestion of a
general theory of recovery for relationship-specific investments,
pointing to pragmatic difficulties in limiting its application and
raising slippery-slope objections. Should every relationship be
subject to notification-of-termination requirements, Baker asks?
Baker concludes by defending the differential treatment of marriage
and employment relationships at termination.
In Enforcing Bargains In An Ongoing Marriage, Mary Anne Case

notes that courts are generally unwilling to enforce bargains within an
ongoing marriage, in contrast to their increasingly receptive approach
to the enforcement of contracts within other long-term sexual
relationships. Case argues that the U.S. courts are an appropriate
forum for the enforcement of bargains within an ongoing marriage
because, if the courts are closed to such couples, they will look
elsewhere for an authority to intermediate their disputes. Those
authorities, such as religious bodies or individual clergy, may have
views about appropriate gender roles within marriage that are limited
within the U.S. courts by constitutional protections, such as the ban
against slavery and the guarantees of equal protection and due
process.
In response, Robert A. Pollak employs a critique of economic
models of bargaining behavior to argue that, though enforceability of
contracts within an ongoing marriage may improve upon the "love it
or leave it" rule condemned by Case, the magnitude of the
improvement would likely be small. Pollak argues that relevant
economic models overstate the likelihood of inefficiency in the
absence of contractual enforcement because they fail to account for
three less costly and more effective mechanisms: internalized norms,
self-help, and non-legal third-party help. Economic bargaining
models also tend to ignore inefficiencies in the legal enforcement of
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bargains in an ongoing marriage, including enforcement costs, the
relational nature of such contracts, and the reluctance of family
members to enter into contracts. As a result, he argues, Case's
proposal is likely to involve only an incremental improvement over
the status quo.
In IncorporatingThe Hendricksons, Larry E. Ribstein argues that
recent proposals to apply the business associations model to domestic
relationships risk undermining the integrity of both business
association law and family law, because the two types of
relationships differ in significant respects. These differences, Ribstein
contends, relate to the separation between the individual and the
organization, the trust and confidence among the members, and the
broader social effects of governing the organizations. Ribstein
concludes that there are some similarities between the business
association and the family in basic function-each deal with longterm human relationships and the agency, opportunism, and other
problems arising from such dealings. But the differences are many,
suggesting that the law should provide for multiple forms in each
category, while maintaining a separation between business and
familial standard forms. Though the law should not seek to preclude
any ultimate convergence of business and domestic standard forms as
social conceptions of those entities change over time, "distinct
standard forms should facilitate but not drive these social judgments."
Robert C. Ellickson agrees with Ribstein's conclusion that a direct
transplant of forms between the business and domestic domains is
unwise, but contests Ribstein's prediction that the two types of forms
may ultimately converge, should conceptions of marriage change
significantly over time. Relying on Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Ellickson argues that lawmakers should strive, not for more
standard forms, but for an optimal number of standard forms. This
optimal number would provide transactors a range of choices,
without unduly increasing information costs. Ellickson concludes that
marriage as an institution is currently desired by a wide range of
adults seeking to enter unconditional trusting relationships that
provide a robust form of social insurance and a mechanism for child
rearing. He predicts that the demand for the marital standard form
will endure, making convergence with business forms unlikely.
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In Testing as Commodification, Katharine Silbaugh argues that
debates within the standardized testing literature represent a split
similar to the one witnessed in traditional debates on the
commodifying effects of market exchange: those who extol the
virtues of a common metric by which to make comparisons and
evaluations, on the one hand, versus those who argue that test scores
have swallowed other notions of the public good in education, on the
other. Silbaugh concludes that "from the comparison we draw
cautionary notes for the testing movement, areas for further research
about motivation in behavioral science, and translation of a
philosophical debate into practical policy."
Kieran Healy responds in Counting and Commodifying, posing
three possible responses to the article: first, that testing is not really
commodification; second, that perhaps testing is not as bad as
Silbaugh suggests; and, finally, that it may be mistaken to envision
certain subjects and practices as intrinsically unquantifiable. While
the first two responses are critiques of the article's central claims, the
third suggests that the problem identified is even more general than
Silbaugh implies. Healy concludes that the problems Silbaugh
identifies are not market-like flaws caused by the recent introduction
of standardized testing, but rather are "well-known features of
bureaucratic administration."
Kimberly Krawiec also responds to Silbaugh in The Dark Side of
Commodification Critiques: Politics & Elitism in Standardized
Testing, arguing that, though the testing-as-commodification analogy
is imperfect, it shows more than Silbaugh acknowledges. Whereas
Silbaugh concludes that her comparison demonstrates the failure of
standardized testing, Krawiec contends that it primarily demonstrates
the politically driven and elitist nature of much of the standardized
testing debate. She concludes that commodification objections long
have held an elitist flavor and-because they are more likely to
resonate with audiences than narrower appeals to self-interest-have
been invoked for political gains. If standardized testing debates bear
similarities to market commodification debates, it is only natural, she
argues, that the parallels extend to these traits as well.
In "Money Can't Buy Me Love:" How Sex Therapy Became a
Commodity in the Age of Viagra, Susan Ekberg Stiritz and Susan
Frelich Appleton explore the evolution of sex therapy, arguing that
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the initial promise of transformative and liberatory practices that
would shape egalitarian sexual expectations and practices ultimately
morphed into the commodification of sexuality and the affirmation of
male dominance. As modern medicine co-opted sexual dysfunction in
order to market a variety of prescription drugs such as Viagra and
Flibanserin (the pharmaceutical industry's attempt at female Viagra),
"money"-in the form of a push toward corporate profits and global
marketing-once again triumphed over "love" and relationships.
Stiritz and Appleton conclude that Viagra has been embraced by our
culture because it fits into the phallic fantasy model that dominates
the culture, at the expense of a truly mutual sexuality grounded in
relationships.
Adrienne Davis speculates on the intriguing questions raised by
Stiritz and Appleton's essay, wondering about their implications for
cultural understandings of sexual politics. For example, what does it
mean to frame a sexual practice as erotic? Are some forms of
eroticism more legitimate than others? Davis observes that Stiritz and
Appleton's analysis implies that medically-enabled erections are
illegitimate, at least as contrasted with erections that are "earned"
through the currency of an interpersonal relationship. What, then, of
singles or the disabled-do they have a right to the erotic? And what
about inegalitarian erotic practices: how should we distinguish the
erotic from the desired, the sexual, or even the pornographic? Finally,
Davis asks, is there a right to an erotic life? If so, how should we
understand it?
In short, whether turning their lens on corporate motivations,
workplace practices and relationships, family law principles,
educational testing, or sex therapy, our symposium authors
encountered the ubiquitous love-or-money dichotomy. Some
embraced the dichotomy as natural and logical, while others
criticized it as a product of social construction that reinforces existing
power differentials or fails to reflect behavioral realities. All of the
essays emphasize the powerful role that law plays in reifying the
love/money distinction, a story which is both familiar and
simultaneously hopeful for legal policymakers interested in the
possibilities for legal reform.
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